

Safety Classification of a Fusion DEMO

Presented at SOFE-24
June 24, 2011

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Overview of the DEMO program of Korea

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
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Scope of Works

- Develop Technologies for the Design, Fabrication and Construction of DEMO Systems and Components
- Complete DEMO FEED and Prove Economic and Technical Feasibilities;
- Construct the Validation Test Facilities and Validate the Design Methods


Timelines



Resource Forecasts

- 420 at the Peak, 2,200 Man-years NFRI Staff
- 450 million USD Total Capital Investment

Forecasted Cash Flows



New Campus and Validation Test Facilities Plan



Scope of Works

- Design and Construct the Fusion DEMO Plant;
 - Test Materials, Components and Systems;
 - Demonstrate Power Generation (1st Phase)
- ※ Performance and Economic Feasibility (2nd Phase, after 2036)

Timelines (1st Phase DEMO)


'2022	'2024	'2025	'2029	'2033	'2035	'2036
Construction Permit	Start Excavation	Select the Materials	Start Installation of Major Components	Start Commissioning	Start Operation	First Electric Power Generation

The 2nd Phase DEMO

- Select a New Set of the DEMO Materials (2030)
- Complete the Design Improvements (2033)
- Second Stage DEMO Construction Permit (2037)
- Improve the DEMO Plant (2038)

Resource Forecasts

- 4.5 to 11 billion USD with an order of magnitude method
- 600 at the peak and 3,600 man-years NFRI staff



A Hypothetical View of Fusion DEMO Plant




I. Background


- Processes for Developing DEMO
- IAW vs. Properly
- Compulsory Top-tier Requirements




Processes for Developing DEMO (1)



Typical Processes of NPP



Proposed Processes for DEMO




With C&S	Without C&S
Design sth IAW C&S applicable	Properly design sth
Select the material IAW C&S applicable	Properly select the material
Fabricate sth IAW C&S applicable	Properly fabricate sth
Test IAW C&S applicable	Properly test sth
Install sth IAW C&S applicable	Properly install sth
Commission sth IAW C&S applicable	Properly commission sth
Operate and inspect sth IAW C&S applicable	Properly operate and inspect sth

- Impossible to convert sth to C&S,
Impossible to design and build sth.
- Impossible to translate sth into a law (laws)
Impossible to license sth.
- Including GDC (General Design Criteria),
Classification Criteria,
and QA Requirements
(Also have Cost Implications)

II . Exploratory Safety Studies

- Pressure Build-up after an In-vessel LOCA
- Radiation Releases after Postulated Events





Radiation Releases after Postulated Accidents **NFRI**

- A breach of VV or tritium piping systems;
- A typical NPP site is postulated;
- Total release of 1kg of tritium at the height 10m, wind velocity of 6.4km/h, and under the most unstable atmospheric condition;
- The radiation dose in disintegration rate is 37 TBq.

Distance (Km)	Dose Rate in mSv
0.8	240
1.6	150
3.2	100
16.0	80
24.0	46
48.0	7

III. Safety Classification of NPP

- Criteria of the Boundaries of SSCs
- Criteria of Radiation Releases
- Classification of SSCs of NPP



- Quality Group, Safety Class, Seismic Category, IEEE Electrical Class;
- Quality Group A = Safety Class 1 = Seismic Category I = SSCs (Structures, Systems, and Components) in the Reactor-Coolant-Pressure-Boundary (RCPB);
- Quality Group B = Safety Class 2 = Seismic Category I = SSCs in the Reactor Containment Boundary (RCB);
- Quality Group C = Safety Class 3 = Seismic Category I = SSCs of the Other Safety Functions

- Quality Group, Safety Class, Seismic Category, IEEE Electrical Class;
- Quality Group A = ditto = SSCs (Structures, Systems, and Components) in the Reactor-Coolant-Pressure-Boundary (RCPB);
- Quality Group B = ditto = No US Regulations
- ※ ESPN N2 = SSCs of which a failure could lead to the radiation release of exceeding 3.7GBq (ESPN of France)
- Quality Group C = ditto = SSCs of which a failure could lead to the radiation release of exceeding 50mSv (RG 1.26 of US).
- ※ ESPN N3 = exceeding 370 MBq

Classification of SCCs of NPP

Classification Category	Classification Criteria and Applicable C&S
<p>Safety Class of ANS (American Nuclear Society) and ASME for Fluid systems, Pressure Vessels, Piping, Pumps and Valves</p>	<p><u>Safety Class 1:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The components specified in the left column and systems of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary; - ASME Section III Sub-section NB <p><u>Safety Class 2:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The components and systems of Reactor Containment Boundary; - ASME Section III Sub-section NC <p><u>Safety Class 3:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The components and fluid systems performing safety functions during normal operations or after a postulated events but not classified as Safety Class 1 and 2; - ASME Section III Sub-section ND <p><u>Non-Nuclear Safety Class:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Systems and components not performing safety functions; - For vessels, ASME Section VIII; - For piping and valves, ASME B31.1 - For pump, best engineering practices
<p>Quality Group for for the Systems, Pressure Vessels, Piping, Pumps and Valves</p>	<p><u>Quality Group A:</u> Safety Class 1 systems and components <u>Quality Group B:</u> Safety Class 2 systems and components <u>Quality Group C:</u> Safety Class 3 systems and components <u>Quality Group D^a:</u> Non-Nuclear Safety Related systems and components</p>
<p>Safety Designation for SSCs and Systems^b</p>	<p><u>Safety Related:</u> SSCs and systems performing safety functions during normal operations or after a postulated events <u>Non-Safety Related:</u> SSCs and systems not classified as Safety Related</p>
<p>Seismic Category for SSCs^b</p>	<p><u>Seismic Category I:</u> SSCs of which Quality Group is A, B, or C and Portions of the fire fighting systems that shall remain functional in the event of a safe-shutdown earth quake <u>Seismic Category II:</u> SSCs remain integrity in the event of an operational base earth quake <u>Non-Seismic:</u> SSCs other than Seismic Category 1 and 2</p>
<p>Classification for the electrical, and instrumentation & control components</p>	<p><u>IEEE Electrical Class 1E:</u> Electrical systems and components performing safety functions <u>IEEE Non-Class 1E:</u> Electrical systems and components other than Class 1E</p>

IV. Classification for DEMO Plant

- Classification Criteria Proposed
- Classification of SSCs of DEMO Plant



- Quality Group, Safety Class, Seismic Category, IEEE Electrical Class;
- Quality Group A = Safety Class 1 = No SSCs due to the Inherent-Passive-Safety of the Fusion Reactor;
- Quality Group B = Safety Class 2 = SSCs of which a failure could lead to the radiation release of exceeding 3.7GBq;
- Quality Group C = Safety Class 3 = SSCs of which a failure could lead to the radiation release of exceeding 50mSv or 370 MBq;
- Seismic Category I and IEEE Electrical Class 1E for the Safety Related SSCs.

SSCs	Proposed Classification Criteria
Systems and Components of VVPB including the Tritium Systems	Quality Group B, Seismic Category I
Systems and Components of RCB	Quality Group B, Seismic Category I
SSCs of VVPB	Safety Related, Seismic Category I
Engineered Safety Features (Fluid systems)	Quality Group B, Seismic Category I
Safety Related Electrical and I&C Systems and Components	Class 1E, Seismic Category I
BOP Safety-Related Systems and Components	Quality Group C, Seismic Category I
BOP Safety-Related Structures	Safety Related, Seismic Category I
In Vessel Components	Quality Group B, Seismic Category I

V. The Other Requirements

- Applicability of GDC and QA of NPP to DEMO
- Review on the Applicability of GDC



- For the Front-end Design Studies of DEMO , QA 'As They Are';
- GDC 'With Some Modifications' based on Postulations and Assumptions.


General Design Criteria	Applicability
1 Quality Standards and Records	Use As Is
2 Design Based for Protection Against Natural Phenomena	
<i>3 Fire protection</i>	
<i>4 Environmental and dynamic effects design bases</i>	
<i>5 Sharing of structures, systems, and components</i>	Not Applicable
<i>10. Reactor design</i>	Need Modification
<i>11 Reactor inherent protection</i>	Not Applicable
<i>12 Suppression of reactor power oscillations</i>	Need Modification
<i>13 Instrumentation and control</i>	
<i>14 Reactor coolant pressure boundary</i>	
<i>15 Reactor coolant system design</i>	
<i>16 Containment design</i>	Use As Is
<i>17 Electric power systems</i>	
<i>18 Inspection and testing of electric power systems</i>	
<i>19 Control room</i>	
III. Protection and Reactivity Control System (GDC 20 through GDC 29)	Not Applicable
<i>30 Quality of reactor coolant pressure boundary</i>	Need Modification
<i>31 Fracture prevention of reactor coolant pressure boundary</i>	Need Modification
<i>32 Inspection of reactor coolant pressure boundary</i>	Need Modification
<i>33 Reactor coolant makeup</i>	Use As Is

General Design Criteria	Applicability
GDC 34 through 40	Not Applicable
<i>41 Containment atmosphere cleanup</i>	Use As Is
<i>42 Inspection of containment atmosphere cleanup systems</i>	Not Required for the Studies of the Design Concept of DEMO
<i>43 Testing of containment atmosphere cleanup systems</i>	
<i>44 Cooling water</i>	
<i>45 Inspection of cooling water system</i>	
<i>46 Testing of cooling water system</i>	Need Modification
<i>50 Containment design basis</i>	Not Required for the Studies of the Design Concept of DEMO
<i>51 Fracture prevention of containment pressure boundary</i>	
<i>52 Capability for containment leakage rate testing</i>	
<i>53 Provisions for containment testing and inspection</i>	Use As Is
<i>54 Piping systems penetrating containment</i>	Need Modification
<i>55 Reactor coolant pressure boundary penetrating containment</i>	Need Modification
<i>56 Primary containment isolation</i>	Need Modification
<i>57 Closed system isolation valves</i>	Use As Is
<i>60 Control of releases of radioactive materials to the environment</i>	
<i>61 Fuel storage and handling and radioactivity control</i>	
<i>62 Prevention of criticality in fuel storage and handling</i>	
<i>63 Monitoring fuel and waste storage</i>	
<i>64 Monitoring radioactivity releases</i>	

VI. Conclusion



- Developing the Top-tier Requirements Are Urgent for the DEMO Design Studies;
- Collaborative Efforts ASME Section III, Division IV Working Group as a Facilitator Could Be a Practical Way to Go;
- This Approach may expedite involvement of industries as well.



National Fusion Research Institute realizes
Green Korea getting joined with human beings,
environment and technology



Thank You

NFRRI 국가핵융합연구소
National Fusion Research Institute